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Risking Communications
Security: Potential Hazards
of the Protect America Act
A new US law allows warrantless wiretapping whenever
one end of the communication is believed to be outside
national borders. This creates serious security risks:
danger of exploitation of the system by unauthorized
users, danger of criminal misuse by trusted insiders, and
danger of misuse by government agents.
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n August 2007, United States’ wiretapping
law changed: the new Protect America Act
permits warrantless foreign-intelligence wiretapping from within the US of any communications believed to include a party located outside
it. US systems for foreign intelligence surveillance
located outside the United States minimize access to
the traffic of US persons by virtue of their location.
The new act could lead to surveillance on an unprecedented scale that will unavoidably intercept some
purely domestic communications. A civil liberties
concern is whether the act puts Americans at risk of
spurious—and invasive—surveillance by their own
government, whereas the security concern is whether the new law puts Americans at risk of illegitimate
surveillance by others.
Building surveillance technologies into communication networks is risky. The Greeks learned this
lesson the hard way; two years ago, they discovered
that legally installed wiretapping software in a cellphone network had been surreptitiously enabled by
parties unknown, resulting in the wiretapping of
more than 100 senior members of the government for
almost a year.1 Things are not much better in Italy,
where a number of Telecom Italia employees have
been arrested for illegal wiretapping (with attempts
at blackmail).2
In this article, we focus on security, not civil liberties. If the intercept system is to work, it is important
that the surveillance architecture not decrease the security of the US communications networks. Although
we are writing about a US law and its consequences
for the security of US communications, the examples

of Greece and
Italy make clear
that the same issues occur internationally.

Background
The combination of data sources may make this surveillance more powerful—and create more risk—than
was intended. We start with background on legal and
policy issues, then technical concerns; this extensive
background is necessary because architecture matters
a lot, and in subtle ways.

Legal and policy issues
US wiretap law has a long and complex history. (See
the sidebar, “US wiretap law,” for a summary; other
work has more details.3) Briefly, there are different
standards and procedures for criminal versus national
security wiretaps; in the latter case, so-called Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants can be
issued for specific circumstances:
• any person in the US communicating via wire (the
word “wire” includes fiber optics);
• a US person (including US citizens, permanent
residents, and US corporations)4 in the US whether
communicating via wire or radio; and
• any person in the US communicating via radio with
people, all of whom are also in the US5 (the rules
are, in fact, even more complicated, but this is sufficient for our purposes).
Warrants are generally not needed to intercept radio
communications.
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The Protect America Act (Public Law No. 110-55)
dropped the warrant requirement for communications (over any medium) of US persons located in the
United States with persons “reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States.”6 Modern communications technology—mobile phones, WiFi, and the
Internet—often make it difficult to discern whether
communication is from a location inside or outside
the US, so the question is on what basis communications will be collected. In other words, there is an important distinction between the requirements of the
law and what can be done with available technology.
Much of the motivation for changes to FISA arises
from the geography of the world’s communications
infrastructure combined with recent changes to telecommunications technology. The US is a major hub
in our communication-centered world, giving the
National Security Agency (NSA), which is the US
signals intelligence agency, significant opportunities
for access to transit traffic.
There are numerous reasons for US centrality in
the world’s communications systems. One is cost: the
US is the world’s leading economy, and fiber optic
cables—how modern wired communications travel—
have been built installed between the US and overseas.
With their economies of scale, these cables enable US
providers to underbid regional carriers—for example,
much of South America transits its traffic through
Miami. Another reason is politics, which can lead to
strange communication paths. For many years, communications could not travel directly between Taiwan
and the People’s Republic of China: calls traveled by
way of Sacramento via AT&T lines. A third reason is
the Internet. Many servers that are the very reason for
communication—for example, Yahoo Mail, Hotmail,
and Gmail—are in the US (although this is an everdecreasing percentage of the world’s mail servers, especially as China comes online).
At the time that FISA was written, communications satellites (radio) had revolutionized international
communications. In subsequent decades, there was a
major shift to fiber optic cables with a decreasing percentage of intercontinental communications traveling
by radio. Thus the exemption allowing warrantless
radio interception became increasingly less applicable.
In recent years, the NSA has pressed to have the exemption updated. While many in the field agree that
there is plausibly a problem resulting from the introduction of fiber optic cables, the Protect America Act
went considerably further.

Collection
Signals intelligence is organized into a seven-step process: access, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis (intelligence analysis), reporting, and dissemination.
The first three are of particular concern. Access is what

happens at a radio, a fiber splitter, a tap on a wire, or a
tap in a telephone switch. Collection is the process of
recording signals for consideration. Recorded signals
can be kept briefly or for very long periods.
Processing is shorthand for selecting the information you want (and filtering out what you don’t). As
in any learning process, if you can find information
at all, you often have too much of it and must extract
what interests you from what doesn’t. This is where
the choice of architecture is significant, both in terms
of minimizing data collection and in determining
how the combination of data sources is used. We return to this point later.
Increasingly, communications are IP-based. The
Internet is the interconnection of many networks,
and these connections occur in various ways. For the
largest networks, these form at peering connections:
interconnections between administratively separate
domains (such as ISPs).
International communications enter the US by
satellite, terrestrial microwave, older copper cable,
and newer fiber optic cable. There are roughly 25
cable heads in the US. (This is an estimate based on
Telegeography’s “Global Communications Cable and
Satellite Map 2002,” which shows four cable heads
on the Atlantic Coast and five on the Pacific. There
are at least an additional five each coming terrestrially
from Canada and Mexico.) At the cable head, incoming signals split in several ways. First, the signals are
sent via multiplexors and demultiplexors to the proper
carriers (since most transoceanic fibers are owned by
consortia of communications companies). Each carrier’s channels are further subdivided: voice signals are
sent (perhaps via other gear) to phone switches, Internet signals to routers, and so on.

A likely architecture
The NSA has not disclosed its surveillance architecture, so it is impossible to know exactly how its system
works. However, a current court case gives hints. In
late 2005 and spring 2006, The New York Times and
USA Today revealed that the NSA had been wiretapping without warrants post-9/11. Shortly afterward,
civil liberties groups and individuals sued AT&T over
the “illegal spying of telephone and Internet communications.” Affidavits filed in Tash Hepting et al. v.
AT&T Corporation et al.,7 describe the NSA surveillance architecture at the AT&T switching office in
San Francisco. AT&T has acknowledged the authenticity of the documents describing the layout and
configuration for the secure room in its San Francisco
office, which is where electronic surveillance took
place.8 Our discussion is based on these documents
and on affidavits submitted by two expert witnesses,
Mark Klein (a technician in the AT&T San Francisco
office)9 and J. Scott Marcus (a designer of large-scale
www.computer.org/security/       n      IEEE Security & Privacy
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US wiretap law

T

hrough the decades, electronic surveillance has been effective in both capturing and convicting criminals and spies, as
well as in denying them and terrorists full use of modern communications out of the fear of being eavesdropped, tracked, and
caught. Although rarely mentioned, the latter is a particularly
important side effect of electronic surveillance. But while there
is no question that electronic surveillance can be extremely effective, there has always been tension between national security
and privacy.
Prior to the Protect America Act, United States wiretapping
law was essentially governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351), which regulated the procedure for wiretaps in criminal investigations, and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA; P.L. 95-511), which
did the same for foreign intelligence surveillance. These laws and
their later derivatives laid out clear and specific procedures for
obtaining wiretap warrants, which, with very minor exceptions,
specified the particular line (or particular IP address or email
account) on which the tapping was to occur.1 Law enforcement
obtained a warrant and sent this information to the communications provider, which installed the tap.
The US learned the hard way that oversight was critical if
surveillance technologies were to be kept within legal bounds.
During the Watergate era, the Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities
investigated 35 years of government electronic surveillance in
the US, uncovering many abuses. These included wiretaps on
congressional staff, Supreme Court Justices, Martin Luther King
Jr. (in his case, sometimes for purely political purposes), as well
as government investigations of such decidedly non-violent
groups as the American Friends Service Committee, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the
Women’s Strike for Peace. It was clear that the “national security”
rationale for many of the wiretaps was not justified. FISA was
passed in response to these issues; the requirements governing
FISA wiretapping were lifted almost verbatim from the carefully
crafted recommendations of the Senate committee report.2
Some of these safeguards delimiting government surveillance
were removed by the USA Patriot Act (arguably the most important change the Patriot Act made in wiretapping law was modifying the requirement that foreign intelligence be the “primary”
purpose of a FISA tap to a “significant” purpose3).
The law was also clear in its exception: no warrant was
required to intercept radio communications between persons in
the US and persons abroad unless the government was intentionally targeting a particular known US person who was in the
US. This exception was viewed as a temporary one; the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report on the FISA legislation makes clear

IP-based data networks, former CTO at GTE Internetworking and at Genuity, and former senior advisor
for Internet Technology at the US Federal Communications Commission).10
Optical fiber carrying the inter-ISP peering traffic associated with AT&T’s Common Backbone11 was
“split,” dividing the signal so that 50 percent went to
each output fiber (the weakened signal on each output
fiber still contained sufficient information to allow
reading the communications).12 One of the output fibers was diverted to the secure room; the other carried
communications on to AT&T’s switching equipment.
The secure room contained Narus traffic analyzers
and logic servers; Narus states that such devices are
capable of real-time data collection (recording data
for consideration) and capture at 10G bits per second
(bps). Certain traffic was selected and sent over a dedicated line to a “central location.” The San Francisco
office set up was one of many throughout the country,
including in Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles, and San
Diego.13 According to Marcus’s affidavit, the diverted
traffic “represented all, or substantially all, of AT&T’s
peering traffic in the San Francisco Bay area,”14 and
thus, “the designers of the ... configuration made no
attempt, in terms of location or position of the fiber
split, to exclude data sources comprised primarily of
domestic data.”15
26
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Call detail records
Modern telecommunications allow the construction
of smooth-running organizations that span the globe;
telecommunications are the nervous systems of these
organizations. The “reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States” aspect of the Protect America Act arguably changes the rules on the government’s
use of call detail records (CDRs), which can be surprisingly revelatory of relationships and organizational
structure (although this data does not always reveal
where communicating parties are physically located).
It appears that the US government has real-time access
to CDRs without need for a court order.
CDRs are essentially the raw data for traditional
phone bills. Phone companies build and maintain
comprehensive databases of such information, which
contain complete call traffic data: records of such
transactional information as calling and called numbers for phone calls, IP addresses and user URIs in
the case of voice-over IP (VoIP); SMTP headers for
emails; location, time, and date of communications;
call duration; and related information. To listen to
an organization’s communications is to read its mind,
and following just the pattern of its communications
is a large step in this direction. CDRs provide a window into the past. Phone companies use such data
for billing, engineering, marketing, and fraud detec-
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that interception of radio communications was to be considered
separately.4 But separate legislation never came to pass, and the
exception continued.

that are issued with no judicial oversight and that require the
recipient to turn over certain records. The Inspector General concluded that FBI agents might have violated the law 3000 times

In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft proposed changing
FISA procedures. The FISA Court, whose job it is to review FISA
wiretapping warrant applications, was not pleased with this, in
part because of mistakes that had occurred in earlier FISA applications. The court issued a report criticizing the proposal5 and the
US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) mishandling of the wall
between foreign intelligence cases and criminal investigations:
“In virtually every instance, the government’s misstatements and
omissions in FISA applications and violations of the Court’s orders
involved information sharing and unauthorized disseminations
to criminal investigators and prosecutors.” An extremely important check on government abuse is oversight. As the founders
of the US knew, another branch of government can provide the
objectivity necessary for such an investigation. Public knowledge
also matters. When the FISA court was dissatisfied with the Bush
Administration’s actions in 2002, it declassified its opinion,5 helping to shape the later debate on the USA Patriot Act renewal and
other administration requests for changes in the wiretap laws.
Some might argue that the excesses of surveillance in the
1960s and ’70s were long ago, occurring during a period of
domestic unrest and international tension. But government excesses in this realm continue. A recent report by the FBI Inspector
General, for example, sharply criticized the bureau regarding its
abuse of National Security Letters, “administrative” subpoenas

since 2003 in their collection of telephone and financial records
of US citizens and foreign nationals.6

tion. Unlike a wiretap or pen register, which provide,
respectively, real-time access only to the content or
number currently being dialed, a CDR database
contains a wealth of data on previous communications. Thus, an interested government agency doesn’t
need to have the proper legal authorization or technology in place before a call is made but may search
the call detail database during the communication to
determine a “community of interest”—the network
of people with whom the suspect is in contact—as
well as later, once a new target has been identified.
For international and some purely domestic calls, two
CDRs exist for each communication, one from the
origination point—which could be an interface to
another company—and one from the termination.
Although transactional information has historically
been viewed as much less deserving of privacy protection than call content, in fact, access to CDRs can be a
major privacy risk. Corinna Cortes and her colleagues
at AT&T Shannon Labs showed, for example, that,
even though the calling number had changed, it was
possible to identify an individual caller from a 300Tbyte CDR database by simply looking at patterns
of called numbers.16 While at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, George Danezis related a story in which
Intel researchers studying ambient Bluetooth activity to improve ad-hoc routing protocols issued staff
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members Bluetooth devices. One of the discoveries
was that a pair of researchers were meeting nightly,
a relationship that had not been previously known to
the other lab members.17
CDRs can be used for targeting more detailed
surveillance, such as wiretapping. The more tightly
coupled CDR and content collection are, the more
likely it is that, without regard to the intentions of the
parties involved, content wiretapping will occur as a
result of CDR information.

Difficulties in monitoring
international Internet traffic

Monitoring international traffic requires an effective
way to identify whether communication starts or ends
outside the US. This is a surprisingly difficult problem
to solve on today’s Internet. Perhaps even more surprisingly, this is not an easy task on a telephone network either. According to a 1998 National Academies
study, “the underlying telephone network is unable to
provide [caller ID] information with high assurance
of authenticity.”18 (Or, to put it another way, although
CDR is an amazingly effective guide to communications activity, the data can’t always provide real-time
answers about a call’s location.) NSA has worked on
the problem, and the agency even has a patent for using
time latency to determine a communication’s location
www.computer.org/security/       n      IEEE Security & Privacy

27

Communications Security

(US Patent # 6,947,978: Method for geolocating logical network addresses).
International traffic monitoring requires either
limiting monitoring to links that carry only international traffic or filtering out any traffic transferred

Even if the traffic does not traverse
a relay or anonymizer, real-time association
of an IP address with a particular person
of interest is difficult.
between two domestic hosts. The first approach seems
easy if monitoring is limited to cable heads connecting the US to other countries. The second approach
also seems easy, by mapping the IP addresses of the
sending and receiving hosts to their geographic locations. However, both approaches have limitations.
Although most traffic on international links travels
to or from a foreign host, a small amount of domestic
traffic traverses these links as well—for example, some
domestic traffic travels through Canada and then back
to the US due to the vagaries of Internet routing.
(This is partially a result of a 1940s AT&T master plan
that made the US, Canada, and most of the Caribbean one integrated country, with no cable heads, or
even international gateways, between them.) As such,
monitoring links at the US border, with the goal of
warrantless tapping of international traffic, could lead
to unintentional tapping of domestic traffic. Because
these links operate at a very high speed, it is difficult
to analyze measurement data as they are collected.
Furthermore, Internet traffic does not necessarily follow symmetric paths—the traffic from host A to host
B does not necessarily traverse the same links as the
traffic from B to A—so monitoring both ends of a
conversation sometimes requires combining data collected from multiple locations, making this type of
monitoring difficult in practice.
Monitoring very close to the sending or receiving
host ensures that both directions of the traffic are visible and that the link speeds are typically small enough
for detailed data collection. But monitoring near the
domestic endpoint would almost certainly capture
a large amount of traffic exchanged with other USbased hosts. To identify and filter the domestic traffic,
a signals intelligence agency such as the NSA could
map the remote host’s IP address to a country using
registries that identify the institution that owns the IP
address block. The problem is that these registries are
notoriously incomplete and out of date. Instead, the
NSA could use existing IP geolocation services (such
as Quova, www.quova.com). Although such services
are often accurate to a few tens of miles, errors of hun28
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dreds of miles or more are not uncommon. As such,
a host might easily look as though it resides on the
opposite side of the border with another country, such
as Mexico or Canada.
Even if geolocation services are accurate, the
source and destination addresses in the IP packet do
not necessarily correspond to communicating hosts.
Some VoIP services, such as Skype, routinely use relay
nodes to enable calls between two hosts that could not
otherwise communicate, due to a firewall or a Network Address Translator (NAT), a device that enables
multiple hosts on a private network to access the Internet using a single public IP address. A relay node is
a third machine that might reside in the same country
as one, or both, of the other hosts, or in yet a third
country. Depending on where traffic is monitored,
the source or destination address can correspond to
the relay node, rather than one of the communicating
endpoints, complicating efforts to determine whether
both endpoints are domestic. In addition, some users apply anonymization tools like Tor (The Onion
Router) that intentionally hide source and destination addresses from packet sniffers. Whether traffic
traverses a relay or an anonymizer, the monitor could
capture erroneous IP addresses that do not correspond
to the ultimate source and destination of the traffic.
Even if the traffic does not traverse a relay or anonymizer, real-time association of an IP address with
a particular person of interest is a difficult task. (We
should note that EU member states consider email addresses, even when not associated with an IP address,
personally identifiable information.) For example, an
IP address might correspond to a NAT box so identifying the particular host responsible for the traffic requires access to transient information available only to
the NAT box. Even in the absence of NAT boxes, the
IP address of each end host can be assigned dynamically through the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). Mapping the IP address to a particular
host may require DHCP logs from the local site, and
these logs are often incorrect.19 Mapping from the host
to a particular user is difficult if the machine is shared
among many people, as at a cybercafe or an academic
lab. In addition, mobile hosts such as laptops or PDAs
frequently acquire new IP addresses.20
Even if the communicating endpoints can be appropriately identified, determining what application
they are running is difficult. (Knowing the application helps determine whether the information will
be useful; there is little foreign intelligence value in
wiretapping a transmission of the latest Hollywood
movie.) In the simplest case, applications are easily
discernible from numerical identifiers (for example,
port numbers) in data packets. However, some applications do not use well-known port numbers, and others intentionally use port numbers normally reserved
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for other applications in order to evade detection; for
example, some peer-to-peer file sharing applications
use port 80, the conventional port for Web traffic.
(There is active research in determining the type of
traffic using other information.) Such analysis is difficult to perform in real time on high-speed links, such
as the links connecting the US to other countries. In
addition, a malicious party trying to avoid detection
might intentionally pad or jitter packets to evade detection, adding further complexity to an already difficult problem. Finally, some applications such as Skype
encrypt data, making it difficult to extract meaningful information about the content of the communication between end hosts.
The real problem is that these difficulties are intrinsic to the Internet’s basic design. Additional issues
arise when interworking VoIP with other telephony
services, such as the public-switched telephone network. An international call might terminate in the US
and then use VoIP the rest of the way (and vice versa),
requiring joint analysis across two kinds of communication networks. The many difficulties in accurately
distinguishing domestic and foreign communication
make it unlikely that an intelligence agency could
avoid tapping domestic calls.

Risks
Surveillance technology is an “architected security
breach”21 into a communications network and thus
a risky business on which to embark. (Telecommunications carriers must “listen in” on communications
for quality control. Intercept architectures are, however, more complicated; they have to target particular
individuals without leaving a trace. Monitoring the
network for quality control is much simpler because
monitoring can pick up any conversation and is allowed to fail more often.) Two situations illuminate
different reasons for our concern.
Let’s go back to a point we brought up earlier. The
Greek wiretapping case began in summer 2004, just
before the Olympic Games in Athens. More than
100 cell phones belonging to the prime minister and
ministers of defense, foreign affairs, justice, and public
order—as well as opposition members in the Greek
parliament—were wiretapped through the activation
of wiretapping modules in the network’s telephone
exchange switches, capabilities that were supposed to
be invoked only with legal authorization. The wiretapping capability had been provided in a system update, but because the Greek Vodaphone network had
not purchased the wiretapping capability, the system
lacked the management software that installed and
logged wiretaps. Not only did the intruders turn on
the network’s wiretapping capability, they also installed a rootkit that hid any activity of their own software updates. Each time there was a communication

on one of the tapped phones, a duplicate communication was sent to one of 14 cell phones in the network,
all of which were prepaid, anonymous accounts.
While we know private communications at the highest levels of the Greek government were wiretapped
for 10 months, who did it remains unknown.1
The US has also experienced difficulties with
communications surveillance systems. Under the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act (P.L. 100-667), the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was responsible for determining technical specifications for wiretapping built into switches of
digital telephone networks. DCS 3000, an FBI suite
of systems for collecting and managing data from wiretaps for criminal investigations, was designed to meet
those requirements. Recently released FBI documents
reveal serious problems in the system’s implementation.22 Its auditing system was primitive, surprising for
a system intended for evidence collection. The system
has no unprivileged user IDs, relying on passwords
rather than token-based or biometric authentication,
and even uses an outdated hashing algorithm (MD5
appears in a 2007 “system security plan,”23 several
years after Chinese researchers found serious problems
with this already weak hashing algorithm). Most seriously, the system relied on a single shared login, rather
than a login per authorized user. The system’s ability
to audit user behavior depended entirely on following
proper processes, including using a manual log sheet
to show who was using the system at a given time.
Remote access—in an insecure fashion—is permitted
from other DCS 3000 nodes, making the system vulnerable to insider attacks. These are a real risk: recall
that the most damaging spy in FBI history, Robert
Hanssen, abused his authorized access to internal FBI
computer systems to steal information and track progress of the investigation aimed at him.
The problems in the DCS 3000 implementation
illustrate the risks in building a communications surveillance system. We do not know whether DCS 3000
was merely poorly implemented or whether it was
poorly specified. What were the requirements on the
FBI system? Did they include full auditing and full
user identity? What were the project’s goals? Were the
designers required to meet all requirements or goals?
These are questions that should have been asked of
the DCS 3000 designers—and should be asked of any
builder of a communications surveillance system.
Although the NSA has extensive experience in
building surveillance systems, that does not mean
things cannot go wrong. When you build a system to
spy on yourself, you entail an awesome risk. In designing a system to satisfy the needs of the Protect America
Act, the risk is made worse by four phenomena:
• removal of a protective role provided by communiwww.computer.org/security/       n      IEEE Security & Privacy
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cation carriers in all previous interception programs
within the US communication system. This protective role was the result of the specificity required in
wiretap warrants.
• placing the system properly within the US rather
than at US borders;
• likelihood that the system will be built out of pieces
previously used abroad, which runs the risk that
opponents are already familiar with the equipment
via intelligence-sharing agreements or capture of
equipment; and
• use of CDRs, originally built for network development purposes, in an entirely new way involving
“customers” outside the phone company.
These architectural decisions facilitate three distinct types of problems:
• system capture to enable spying on US traffic;
• system defeat by using information learned from
foreign examples to defeat selection and filtering
strategies; and
• system spoofing by similar means.

30

Removal of safeguards by communications carriers.

What risks are introduced by leaving a single entity
in charge of selection and retention decisions? “Twoperson control” would be prudent—for example,
control by two authorized parties who understand
how a system should work. In its absence, any process
such as the one apparently embodied in the AT&T
San Francisco switching office (in which communications are diverted to an NSA safe room and then
collected according to rules determined by the intelligence agency) provides little recourse in cases where
mistakes are made.
Lack of inherent technical minimization of traffic.

Intercepting at switches or routers creates unnecessary
risks because the switches handle domestic as well as
foreign communications. This risk, although distinct
from the risk of exploitation by opponents, feeds into
it; potential overcollection of purely domestic traffic
increases the value of targeting the US access and collection system.
Domestic traffic penetrating too deeply into the
NSA collection system. Collection outside the US

All of these can be used not only to make the surveillance system less effective, but also to turn it into
a tool for capturing communications that are not
implicated in any illegal activity—endangering both
security and privacy. We see several specific risks as
a result.

inherently filters out most “US-person traffic” before
it gets to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade. Does the
design of the expanded surveillance system eliminate
domestic traffic early and as effectively? This is more
of a privacy risk than a security one, although insider
attacks make it a security risk as well.

Risk of exploitation by opponents. A system that ac-

CDR information. CDR systems were originally in-

cesses domestic communications necessarily poses a
greater direct risk to the communications of Americans than a surveillance system fielded overseas. To
avoid foreign familiarity with its operation, communication security equipment is not often shared with
allies. However, engineering economy reuses systems
previously fielded abroad; thus, both allies and opponents are likely to be familiar with US surveillance
equipment. Is there a risk that knowledge of the surveillance system acquired by studying equipment
outside the US will be applied to defeating or subverting similar equipment deployed within the US?
Is the NSA designing sufficiently robust mechanisms
to assure complete control of the filtering and selection mechanisms?
Even prior to the Protect America Act, US communications were vulnerable to surveillance, but
building signals intelligence systems is expensive. The
system designed as a result of the Protect America Act
must not reduce foreign powers’ difficulty in gaining
access to US communications. Can the communications of US persons be tapped without increasing the
risk that these communications will be exploited by
others without authorization to do so?

tended to be used by telephone company employees
for determining customer usage patterns and thus anticipating future needs. It is a truism in the security
field that problems frequently occur when new uses
are found for old systems, given that the protection
mechanisms and system architecture were never designed for the extended uses. Will new vulnerabilities
be created when copies of the CDR data are sent to
law enforcement or intelligence agencies? It is impossible to give a definitive answer, but the past history of
such changes does not leave us sanguine.
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Risk reduction
There are also ways in which the Protect America Act
enables an architecture that could reduce risk. Being
able to place equipment on US soil reduces the need
to place equipment abroad. Beyond the direct security risks to equipment, which could be alleviated by
high-quality shielding and tamper resistance, there is
an intrinsic risk. When intercept capability is installed
in other countries’ communication systems, the privilege must be paid for—often by sharing information.
Host countries might demand not only a share of the
intelligence take—whether this could ever pose a
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threat to US communications is hard to assess—but
also inspection authority over the installation and information about techniques. Intercept facilities hosted
by foreign governments are expected not to spy on the
host countries themselves. However, the charge that
the surveillance facilities are doing so is often made,
and the host countries quite reasonably insist on taking measures aimed at preventing this.

New security risks
Security risks are exacerbated by the direction of the
Internet’s development. The Internet is currently a
network with only millions of devices connected to
it, but the world is rapidly moving to a situation in
which billions of small, resource-limited devices such
as RFID tags and sensors will use networks for communication and control. While many of these devices
will be on local area networks, many will use the Internet.24 Any future surveillance architectures must
take such growth and directions into account.
Implicit in the FISA update was the need to protect the US against non-state actors, who have indeed
shown themselves to be adept at using the Internet
to communicate. Some of the tools provided for
by the Protect America Act could in fact aid in the
disruption of various nefarious plots. But building
surveillance technology into a communications infrastructure creates risk of penetration by trusted insiders, foreign powers, and non-state actors (with trusted
insiders being the greatest threat). Disrupting attacks
by non-state actors could be a short-term gain, but
surveillance architectures rarely go away. The dangers
created by the Protect America Act present a longterm risk. (This is exemplified by the exploit in the
Greek wiretapping case, which relied on an earlier
software version that included wiretapping capabilities but not the auditing system.)
The Protect America Act, a law enacted in haste,
holds the possibility of a vast increase in the number
of Americans whose communications and communication patterns will be studied. The surveillance provides access to US communications, a target of great
value. The US could build for its opponents something that would be too expensive for them to build
for themselves: a system that lets them see the US’s
intelligence interests, a system that could tell them
how to thwart those interests, and a system that might
be turned to intercept the communications of American citizens and institutions. It is critical that the new
surveillance system neither enable exploitation of US
communications by unauthorized parties nor permit
abuse by authorized ones.

Recommendations
The change from a system that taps particular lines on
receipt of a wiretap order specifying those lines to one

that sorts through transactional data in real time and
selects communications of interest is massive. Where
interception occurs and how the data sources (CDRs,
traffic, other information) are combined and used will
not only affect how powerful a tool warrantless wiretapping is, but will also affect how likely the system is
to pick up purely domestic communications. In building a communications surveillance system itself—and
saving its enemies the effort—the US government is
creating three distinct serious security risks: danger of
exploitation of the system by unauthorized users, danger of criminal misuse by trusted insiders, and danger
of misuse by US government agents. How should the
US mitigate these risks?

Minimization matters
Allowing collection of calls on US territory necessarily entails greater access to the communications of
US persons. An architecture that minimizes collection of communications lowers the risk of exploitation
by outsiders and exposure to insider attacks. Traffic
should be collected at international cable heads rather
than at tandem switches or backbone routers, which
also carry purely domestic traffic. Although interception at the cable heads will help minimize collection,
it is not sufficient in and of itself. Intercepted traffic
should be studied (by geolocation and any other available techniques) to determine whether it comes from
non-targeted US persons and, if so, discard it before
any further processing is done. It should be fundamental to the system’s design that the combination of
interception location and selection methods minimizes the collection of purely domestic traffic.

Architecture matters
Using real-time transactional information to intercept
high-volume traffic makes architectural choices critical. Robust auditing and logging systems must be part
of the system design. Communication providers, who
have technical expertise and decades of experience
protecting the security and privacy of their customers’
communications, should have an active role in both

It is critical that the new surveillance
system neither enable exploitation of US
communications by unauthorized parties nor
permit abuse by authorized ones.
design and operation. Thus, “two-person control” is
appropriate for this situation.

Oversight matters
The new system is likely to operate differently from
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previous wiretapping regimes and will likely use new
technologies for purposes of targeting wiretaps. There
should be appropriate oversight by publicly accountable bodies. While the details might remain classified,
there should be a publicly known system for handling
situations when mistakes are made. To assure independence, the overseeing authority should be as far
removed from the intercepting authority as practical.
To guarantee that electronic surveillance is effective
and free of abuse and that minimization is in place
and working appropriately, it is necessary that there
be frequent, detailed reports on the system’s functioning. Of particular concern is the real-time use of
CDR for targeting content, which must neither be
abused by the US government nor allowed to fall into
unauthorized hands. For full oversight, such review
should be done by a branch of government different
from the one conducting the surveillance. We recommend frequent ex post facto review of CDR-based
real-time targeting. The oversight mechanism must
include outside reviewers who regularly ask, “What
has gone wrong lately—regardless of whether you recovered—that you have not yet told us about?”

U

S communications security has always been fundamental to national security. The surveillance
architecture implied by the Protect America Act will,
by its very nature, capture some purely domestic communications, risking the very national security that
the act is supposed to protect. In an age so dependent
on communication, the loss could well be greater than
the gain. To prevent greater threats to US national
security, it is imperative that proper security—including minimization, robust control, and oversight—be
built into the system from the start. If security cannot
be assured, then any surveillance performed using that
system will be inherently fraught with risks that are
fundamentally unacceptable.
References
1. V. Prevelakis and D. Spinellis, “The Athens Affair,”
IEEE Spectrum, July 2007, pp. 18–25.
2. P. Kiefer, “Phone Taps in Italy Spur Rush toward Encryption,” New York Times, 29 Apr. 2007; www.ny
times.com/2007/04/29/technology/29cnd-encrypt.
html?ex=1335499200&en=aa06d98a600afc6f&ei=50
88&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
3. W. Diffie and S. Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption, updated and expanded
edition, MIT Press, 2007.
4. US Code, Title 50, section 1801(i), 1978.
5. US Code, Title 50, section 1801(f ), 1978.
6. Protect America Act, section 105(a) 2007.
7. United States Second District Court for Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 Jan. 2006.
32

IEEE Security & Privacy       n      January/February 2008

8. Exhibit A in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T Corporation et
al., United States Second District Court for Northern
California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 June 2006.
9. M. Klein, affidavit in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T Corporation et al., United States Second District Court for Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 June 2006.
10. J.S. Marcus, affidavit in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T
Corporation et al., United States Second District Court
for Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8
June 2006.
11. J.S. Marcus, affidavit in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T Corporation et al., United States Second District Court for
Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 June
2006, p. 15.
12. J.S. Marcus, affidavit in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T Corporation et al., United States Second District Court for
Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 June
2006, pp. 12–14.
13. M. Klein, affidavit in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T Corporation et al., United States Second District Court for
Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 June
2006, p. 7.
14. J.S. Marcus, affidavit in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T Corporation et al., United States Second District Court for
Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 June
2006, p. 24.
15. J.S. Marcus, affidavit in Tash Hepting et al. v. AT&T Corporation et al., United States Second District Court for
Northern California, Case 3: 06-cv-0672-vrw, 8 June
2006, pp. 24–25.
16. C. Cortes, D. Pregibon, and C. Volinsky, “Computational Methods for Dynamic Graphs,” AT&T Shannon
Labs, 9 Jan. 2004.
17. G. Danezis, “Introducing Traffic Analysis: Attacks,
Defences and Public Policy Issues”; http://research.microsoft.com/users/gdane/papers/TAIntro.pdf.
18. F. Schneider (ed.), Trust in Cyberspace, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, 1999, p. 36.
19. R. Clayton, Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace,
Univ. of Cambridge Computer Lab, tech. report 653,
Nov. 2005.
20. S. Bellovin et al., “Security Implications of Applying
the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement
Act to Voice-over IP,” 2006; www.itaa.org/news/
docs/CALEAVOIPreport.pdf.
21. S. Landau, “National Security on the Line,” J. Telecommunications and High Technology Law, vol. 4, no. 2, 2006,
p. 418.
22. EFF v. Department of Justice, Civil Action No. 06-1708CKK (D.D.C.) (filed 3 Oct. 2006); www.eff.org/
issues/foia/061708CKK.
23. Information Assurance Section, US Federal Bureau
of Investigation, “Controlled Interface 100 (CI-100)
System Security Plan (SSP) DCS-3000 to EDMS,” 16
April 2007.

Communications Security

24. S. Landau, “National Security on the Line,” J. Telecommunications and High Technology Law, vol. 4, no. 2, 2006,
pp. 433–434.
Steven M. Bellovin is a professor of computer science at Columbia University. His technical interests include network
security, privacy, and the social implications of computers.
Bellovin has a PhD in computer science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Contact him at smb@
cs.columbia.edu.
Matt Blaze is an associate professor of computer and information sciences and director of the Trusted Network Eavesdropping
and Countermeasures project at the University of Pennsylvania.
His research interests include secure systems, cryptology and
cryptographic protocols, and large-scale systems. Blaze has
a PhD in computer science from Princeton University. He is a
member of the ACM, IACR, and the IEEE, and is a director of the
Usenix association. Contact him at mab@crypto.com.
Whitfield Diffie is chief security officer at Sun Microsystems.
His technical interests include cryptography, network security,
and signals intelligence. Diffie has a doctorate in technical sciences from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Contact
him at whitfield.diffie@sun.com.
Susan Landau is a distinguished engineer at Sun Microsystems, where she works on security, cryptography, and public
policy, including surveillance issues, digital rights manage-

ment, and identity management. She is coauthor (with
Whitfield Diffie) of Privacy on the Line: the Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption, updated and expanded edition
(MIT Press, 2007). Landau has a PhD from MIT, an MS from
Cornell University, and a BA from Princeton University. She is
an AAAS fellow and an ACM distinguished engineer. Contact
her at susan.landau@sun.com.
Peter G. Neumann is principal scientist in the Computer Science Lab at SRI International, where he is concerned with
computer systems and network trustworthiness, security,
reliability, survivability, safety, and many risk-related issues
such as voting system integrity, crypto policy, social implications, and human needs, including privacy. He is the author
of Computer-Related Risks (Addison-Wesley, 1995). Neumann has doctorates from Harvard and Darmstadt. He is a
fellow of the ACM, the IEEE, and AAAS. He moderates the
ACM Risks Forum (comp.risks, www.risks.org). Contact him at
neumann@csl.sri.com.
Jennifer Rexford is a professor of computer science at Princeton University, where she works on Internet measurement,
routing protocols, and network management. She is coauthor (with Balachander Krishnamurthy) of Web Protocols
and Practice: HTTP/1.1, Networking Protocols, Caching,
and Traffic Measurement (Addison-Wesley, 2001). Rexford
has a PhD and MSE from the University of Michigan, and her
BSE degree from Princeton University. Contact her at jrex@
cs.princeton.edu.

Lower nonmember rate
of $29 for S&P magazine!
IEEE Security & Privacy magazine is the premier magazine for security professionals. Each
issue is packed with information about cybercrime, security & policy, privacy and legal issues,
and intellectual property protection.
Top security professionals in the field share information you can rely on:
• SilverBullet podcasts and interviews
• Intellectual Property Protection and Piracy
• Designing for Infrastructure Security
• Privacy Issues
• Legal Issues and Cybercrime
• Digital Rights Management
• The Security Profession

Subscribe now!

www.computer.org/services/nonmem/spbnr
www.computer.org/security/       n      IEEE Security & Privacy

33

